Tools as extensions of the mind

24 Apr 2018

Philosophers have long speculated that our minds are not just in our brains. They are embodied, which is to say that our bodies form part of our minds. Our bodies are not merely peripheral components for input and output. They do some processing too. They release chemicals and process signals, some of which are interpreted in the brain as complex feelings while others remain below the threshold of consciousness. Shockingly, most of the processes in our bodies fall below this threshold. Consciousness really is just the tip of the iceberg, if that.

Andy Clark, David Chalmers, and others take this idea further with the Extended Mind theory. It says that objects in the external environment can also form part of the mind, and that tools can be considered part of our cognitive apparatus. This is fascinating, and it ties in nicely with some things I’ve read lately.

This idea is not new, and Clark and his collaborators acknowledge that. Richard Dawkins’ idea of the Extended Phenotype comes to mind. Although it is different from the Extended Mind, it has a familiar ring to it. Dawkins explores the idea that genetic expression is not limited to animal bodies but extends to the things animals do and make in the environment. Think of beavers, their dams, and the effects those dams have. The dam is an extended genetic trait that alters the environment and is subject to natural selection, much like an organ attached to the animal. Genes most likely shape the beaver’s drive to build a dam. Or give one.

Back to minds. One study demonstrated that the mere presence of a mobile phone lowers cognitive capacity, even when the phone is not in use. The Extended Mind offers one possible explanation: the brain treats the phone and its capabilities as part of its computational space. It knows roughly what the phone can do and would rather delegate those tasks while directing the steps needed to reach the desired outcome. Phones connect us to the internet, search engines, encyclopedias, calculators, GPS, and all sorts of apps that can outperform the brain at specific tasks with very little cognitive effort.

This made me think about the tools we use in daily life as parts of our minds, and whether seeing them that way would change which tools we choose and how we use them. These tools can give us superpowers, but they can also weaken some natural cognitive abilities. Like muscles and many other systems in the body, if you do not use an ability, you lose it, or its neurons are recruited for another job. It makes me think about learned helplessness, our reliance on tools, and the fact that no one really knows how to make anything. Of course, progress is built this way, with competencies stacked on other competencies.

I was not deliberate about the tools I used or how I used them. After considering this, I am starting to think more carefully about both.